Valtik Studios
Free Resource · Incident Response

Incident Response Runbook Template

The first 72 hours. The actions that preserve evidence, contain damage, and put you in position to respond effectively. Not theoretical. This is what we run during active engagements.

Principles before procedures

  • Do not panic. Do not pull cables blindly. Poorly-chosen containment actions destroy forensic evidence.
  • Document everything from minute one. Timestamps, who did what, what was observed. This becomes your regulatory and legal record.
  • Engage legal and breach coach counsel early. Privilege attaches to communications through counsel, not through your internal security team.
  • Do not communicate externally about the incident until legal has cleared it. No tweets, no customer emails, no vendor calls.
  • Assume the adversary is watching your response. Use out-of-band communications (phone, Signal, dedicated ticketing).

Hour 0-1: Initial triage

  • Incident Commander designated (typically CISO or on-call security lead)
  • Scribe designated (takes notes, timestamps, records decisions)
  • Out-of-band communication channel established (Signal group, dedicated Teams/Slack with audit logging off the compromised tenant)
  • Legal counsel notified
  • Initial severity assessment: what is compromised, what is the blast radius
  • Preserve initial evidence (screenshots, log snapshots, endpoint state)
  • Do NOT reboot, reimage, or restore systems. You are destroying evidence

Hour 1-4: Containment without destruction

  • Isolate affected systems at the network layer (firewall rules, not power-off)
  • Disable compromised user accounts, revoke active sessions
  • Rotate credentials accessible to compromised systems (API keys, service account tokens, database passwords)
  • Preserve memory images for forensic analysis if feasible
  • Snapshot affected systems at hypervisor or cloud provider level
  • Preserve network traffic captures if available
  • Begin timeline reconstruction

Hour 4-12: Scope assessment

  • Engage external forensic firm if internal capability is limited (pre-selected via IR retainer is faster)
  • Notify cyber insurance carrier (required under most policies, affects coverage)
  • Begin log analysis: what did the adversary access? For how long?
  • Identify initial access vector (phishing, exploit, valid creds, supply chain)
  • Assess lateral movement extent
  • Determine data exfiltration (check egress logs, DLP alerts, unusual outbound traffic)
  • Identify regulatory notification triggers (HIPAA, GDPR, state breach laws, SEC 4-day, NYDFS 72-hour)

Hour 12-24: Stakeholder notification

  • Executive team briefed with current facts and open questions (not speculation)
  • Board notified per policy
  • Legal drafts initial regulatory notifications (may not send yet, but prepare)
  • Public relations engaged for potential external communications
  • If SEC-reporting company: materiality determination begins formally
  • Decision on law enforcement engagement (FBI, Secret Service, local)

Hour 24-48: Eradication

  • Remove adversary persistence (backdoors, scheduled tasks, registry changes, cron jobs, rogue service accounts)
  • Patch exploited vulnerabilities
  • Rebuild compromised systems from known-good sources (not restore from backup if backup may be compromised)
  • Rotate all credentials that could have been accessed
  • Revoke all long-lived API tokens, certificates accessible from compromised systems
  • Update firewall and EDR rules to block observed adversary tooling and IPs

Hour 48-72: Recovery and notification

  • Restore operations on verified clean systems
  • Enhanced monitoring for 30-90 days post-incident (adversaries often return)
  • File required regulatory notifications within required windows
  • Customer notifications per contract and regulatory requirements
  • Media statement if applicable (legal-cleared only)
  • Begin post-incident review

Scenario-specific notes

Ransomware

  • Do NOT pay without legal and insurance carrier approval
  • Check OFAC sanctions screening before any payment consideration (US Treasury prohibits payments to sanctioned entities)
  • Confirm backup integrity and connectivity to air-gapped storage
  • Preserve ransom note and adversary communications for forensics and attribution
  • NYDFS regulated entities: 24-hour notification on ransom payment plus 30-day written justification

Business Email Compromise (BEC)

  • Identify mailbox rules set by adversary (auto-forwarding, deletion rules)
  • Revoke all OAuth tokens on the affected tenant
  • Check for any wire transfers initiated or modified. Contact bank within hours (often reversible within 24-72 hours)
  • Review related-communication patterns for other compromised mailboxes
  • Contact FBI IC3 within 72 hours for wire fraud reporting (helps with kill chain for recovery)

Credential compromise

  • Disable account; do not just force password reset
  • Revoke all sessions and tokens for the account
  • Review what systems the credential accessed in the last 30 days
  • Check for privilege escalation or lateral movement from the account
  • Audit for creation of additional accounts or modification of existing ones

Data exfiltration

  • Preserve the evidence of what was taken (access logs, egress data volumes)
  • Classify exfiltrated data categories (PII, PHI, cardholder data, trade secrets, regulated data)
  • Notification triggers determined by classification and jurisdiction
  • Assess dark-web exposure (specialized firms monitor for your data appearing for sale)

Regulatory notification quick reference

RegulatorTriggerTimeline
SEC (public companies)Material cyber incident4 business days from materiality determination
NYDFS (regulated financial)Cybersecurity event72 hours
NYDFS (ransom payment)Ransom paid24 hours for notification, 30 days for written justification
HHS OCR (HIPAA)Breach of unsecured PHI60 days for notification (affected individuals, HHS, media for 500+)
GDPR (EU data)Personal data breach72 hours to supervisory authority
State breach lawsVaries by state30-60 days typical; some require AG notification
CISA (critical infrastructure under CIRCIA)Substantial cyber incident72 hours (once CIRCIA final rule effective)

Post-incident review

Within 30 days of incident closure, conduct a post-incident review:

  • Timeline of adversary actions and defender actions
  • Root cause analysis (not just technical root cause. Organizational root cause too)
  • What went well, what did not
  • Remediation tracking with owners and dates
  • Updates to the IR plan based on lessons learned
  • Tabletop exercise scheduled to validate updated plan
IR retainer saves time during incidents. Pre-selecting forensics, legal, and PR partners before an incident means you are calling contacts during the worst hours of the incident instead of cold-pitching. Retainers typically cost $5K-$25K/year and pay for themselves on the first incident.

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