Valtik Studios
Development & Cybersecurity Studio

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Penetration testing, compliance readiness, and secure development for small and mid-size businesses in Connecticut and Dallas–Fort Worth. Senior-only engagements. Reports that exploit, not just scan.

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Recent Research

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Original vulnerability research published regularly. Platform-specific attack patterns, compliance breakdowns, and threat intelligence from active engagements.

Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN13 min

cisco SD-WAN CVE-2026-20182: a missing else-if branch gave UAT-8616 god-mode over the corporate WAN fabric of every Catalyst customer that didn't patch in 3 days

CVE-2026-20182 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controllers is CVSS 10.0 / pre-auth / unauthenticated / remote. The bug is a missing else-if branch in the vdaemon peering authentication service that handles device_type messages on UDP/12346 (DTLS). The switch statement handles vBond, vSmart, vEdge — but the device_type=2 (vHub) case has no verification branch, so the controller unconditionally flips the authenticated flag for anyone who claims to be a vHub. From there: SSH key injection into /home/vmanage-admin/.ssh/authorized_keys, NETCONF on TCP/830 as the high-priv internal vmanage-admin account, then root. CISA KEV added 2026-05-14 with the tightest federal mitigation window of 2026 (3 days, due May 17, ED 26-03). Attribution: UAT-8616 — the threat cluster that has been camping on Cisco SD-WAN since 2023, previously caught burning CVE-2026-20127 / 20133 / 20128 / 20122. Blast radius is the entire enterprise WAN fabric: OMP route tables, TLOC entries, branch-to-branch segmentation, policy distribution. A single controller pop = god-mode over every cEdge/vEdge in the overlay. This post: full bug walkthrough, affected versions and patches (20.9 → 20.18 and 26.1), hunt indicators across SSH/NETCONF/DTLS/config-plane/webshell layers, pre-patch mitigations (no Cisco workaround so perimeter ACL + management-plane lockdown), the post-patch credential rotation list, and Snort SIDs 66482-66483 for IPS detection.

Langflow / AI tooling11 min

langflow CVE-2026-33017: the unauth RCE in your team's AI prototyping tool is exfiltrating your AWS keys in under 20 hours flat

Langflow — the visual builder for LLM agent chains used by AI engineers and MLOps teams — had its second unauthenticated RCE in two years pushed through the same exec() call. The vulnerable endpoint is POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow (note the _public_ — no auth by design), which routes attacker-supplied Python into exec() at src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py:397 with zero sandboxing. Sysdig honeypots logged the first probe 20 hours after disclosure on 2026-03-17, the first successful credential exfil within 25 hours, and active exploitation has continued through May 2026. The payload is purpose-built for AI infrastructure: dumps os.environ for AWS_*, OPENAI_*, ANTHROPIC_*, HF_TOKEN, PINECONE_*, SUPABASE_*, GITHUB_TOKEN; drops a 9.4MB Go binary (worker-linux-amd64) using utls for TLS fingerprint spoofing + embedded gitleaks for secret scanning; persists as keyhunter-worker.service; joins a NATS-based C2 botnet at 45.192.109.25:14222 subscribing to task.scan_cde, task.scan_web, task.validate_aws, task.validate_ai. Affected ≤ 1.8.1, patched in 1.9.0. NATS-as-C2 is the new technique infostealer botnets are converging on (sysdig writeup). Why AI/ML tooling is the new Jenkins: broad IAM, default-internet-exposed, :latest tags, high-value secrets in env, no auth gate. Full IOCs, the air-gap-first remediation order (the worker can detect revocation CLI invocations), and the IAM/key-rotation list to clean up after compromise.

Microsoft Exchange Server12 min

exchange CVE-2026-42897: every news outlet is calling this "RCE." it isn't. it's OWA XSS — and the threat model is completely different.

CVE-2026-42897 in on-prem Microsoft Exchange Server is being reported as RCE across every major security outlet this week. It is not RCE. CWE-79 — Cross-Site Scripting in Outlook Web Access. The bug fires when a victim opens a crafted email in OWA. Javascript executes in the victim's authenticated browser session, not on the Exchange server. That distinction completely changes the response playbook: the box is not owned, the user's session is. Patch posture: no permanent fix for Exchange 2016/2019 unless you're enrolled in the Period 2 paid Extended Security Updates program. Exchange SE will receive the public patch. Exchange Online: not affected. This post: why every outlet has the framing wrong, what the post-XSS hunt actually looks like (inbox-rule abuse, EWS post-message-read patterns, MSExchange Management event log), the EEMS M2 mitigation everyone should already have auto-applied, the manual EOMT path for air-gapped boxes, and the PowerShell block to hunt persistence in the last 24 hours. CISA KEV due date for federal mitigation: 2026-05-29.

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